The Crimean Gambit

Throughout history, Crimea has seen its share of political turbulence and bloodshed, with many wars being fought for the occupation of its lands. The Crimean annexation in 2014 isn’t by any means the first in its history. In 1783, Catherine the Great who was fierce in her territorial ambitions after her victory in the Russian-Turkish war, went as far as to violate the Peace Treaty of Kaynarca during her appropriation of the lands. In today’s more modern and mostly civilized world, such seismic political shifts are occurring less by the sword and more by the ballot box. This isn’t to say that ills are no longer committed in territorial disputes however, as Russia and the US/EU bloc seem keen to hurl accusations of criminal misdeeds at each other, reading off a rap sheet apparently longer than the Encyclopedia Britannica. The annexation (or alleged annexation) of Crimea is no exception.

The crisis in Crimea started when the democratically elected president of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych was unable to reach a mutual agreement with opposition leaders. This political stalemate soon resulted in unlawful and violent acts being perpetrated by rival political factions that eventually culminated in a coup d’état. Yanukovych found himself being stripped of his presidential power from the increasing risk of violence and subsequently fled the capital. The interim government led by Oleksandr V. Turchynov then stepped in and scheduled new presidential elections in which businessman Petro Poroshenko was elected president.

In the wake of the coup, the Crimean parliament approved a referendum on whether to secede from Ukraine and join the Russian Federation, or to remain with Ukraine but maintain greater autonomy. The referendum took place on March 16th 2014 and the results showed that an overwhelming majority voted to become a part of Russia. The City Council of Sevastopol also held a separate referendum, which turned out the same result as the Crimean Parliament.

The Ukrainian government in Kiev has since ruled that the Crimean referendum is illegal. Leaders in both the European Union and America also consider the referendum to be illegal as it contravenes the Ukrainian Constitution. The then President Obama issued the first in a number of punitive actions against a number of Russian citizens, which included visa bans on military officials and individuals he deemed responsible for undermining Ukrainian sovereignty in Crimea. The EU were at first reluctant to follow because of their continent’s heavy reliance on Russian oil and gas, but eventually issued sanctions similar to those of the United States. Despite the large (mostly Russian) population supporting Russia, there are still disagreements domestically, with the Tartan minority in Crimea who also viewing the referendum as illegal.

Who’s in the right and who’s in the wrong in this complex scenario, largely depends on whom you ask. The US/EU side of the crisis argues that Russia is to be held entirely accountable. In their eyes the referendum was illegal as it violates Article 5 of the Ukrainian Constitution, in which any constitutional change requires the say of all Ukrainians, not just those of Crimea. On paper this is very much the case, as the decision to hold a referendum was not made by the central government in the Ukrainian capital of Kiev, but by the autonomous local government in the Crimean Parliament. All actions taken by Russia from the results of such an unconstitutional referendum are thusly seen to be both illegitimate and in violation of Ukrainian law.

The EU/US also believe the Ukrainian coup to be justified as Ukrainian president Yanukovych needed to be removed, due to his alleged activities of corruption and embezzlement. It is argued that the former president secretly holds numerous financial holdings and assets both domestically in Ukraine as well as internationally.

The incumbent government that now occupies Ukraine in the wake of the coup also argues that the Crimean vote was not only illegal, but in fact rigged. After the result (in which the notion to join Russia won with over a staggering 90% in favour), a number of widely circulated media reports stemming from Ukrainian news networks talk of how the Russian government accidentally posted the real results on their website. The results indicate that only around 30% of the Crimean people actually voted to secede from Ukraine and join the Russian Federation. Some have pointed out discrepancies however, as a poll done in early 2014 (pre coup) showed that 41% of Crimean people supported union with Russia. Moreover, there are reports of how military personnel dubbed ‘The Green Men’ were seen (particularly around the area of Sevastopol) during the vote. They are allegedly to have been sent by the Kremlin to act as a visual display of power and an intimidating force as the vote was carried out. At first the Kremlin denied this, but Vladimir Putin has since admitted that forces were sent to Crimea.

Europe also takes issue with the results of the referendum due to the claim that it is causing great concern for the minority Tartar population that resides in Crimea. The Tartars have, throughout history under Joseph Stalin, been subject to persecution and discrimination. They fear that to return to living under the wing of the Russian Federation will see that persecution re-newed. This concern solidifies why many Tartans also see the referendum as illegal.

Russia on the other hand argues that the Crimean referendum, and its incumbent result, was legitimate and fair. Firstly, the referendum that was carried out by the Crimean Parliament was conducted with full compliance of international law and the United Nations Charter. They also point out what is said to be one of the most misleading arguments put forward, which is that the referendum is unconstitutional. As mentioned earlier, this is true enough as it requires all of Ukraine to have a vote on it, but Russia argues that the Ukrainian Constitution has been null and void since February 22, 2014. This has been the case ever since the Kiev rioters overthrew the democratically elected President, in what was an armed acquisition of power. Since the coup, Crimea and Russia have instead been guided by the rules laid out by international laws and have exercised the rights laid out in the United Nations Charter regarding the rights to self determination (Article 73, pg. 14). The United Nations International Court of Justice in 2010 also handed down an advisory notice that unilateral declaration of Independence is in accordance with international law. Russia also stipulates that they carried out activities with the Crimean Parliament using reference to UN court rulings on previous territorial matters, most notable in 2011 when the southern territories of Sudan seceded from the rest of the country, to form the independent state of South Sudan.

The Ukrainian coup is another area where Russia and the US fail to see eye to eye. Russia regards the coup as criminal, starting with unlawful political actions that rose in intensity to destabilise Ukraine. Whilst the incumbent government claims that the ousting of Viktor Yanukovych may have been a triumph against corruption, the oligarch Petro Poroshenko is hardly shaping up to be an adequate replacement, with corruption and scandal allegedly as prevalent as ever. Russia also argues that the structures of government have taken a step back post-coup, seeing power that was once given to an elected president now being broken up and divided between Batkivschina and the Svoboda. The Svoboda political party is a group of significant concern both domestically and internationally due to its Neo-Nazi ideology.

The Russian government also contests the notion that the referendum was unjust, due to the presence of armed Russian troops in various districts of Crimea. Whilst at first they denied the presence of armed “Green Men’ operating in Crimea, they have since stated that their presence there was to protect voters from any pre-meditated attacks being carried out by violent political militant groups who would aim to intimidate people from voting. Supporters from both Russia and Crimea have also claimed that if there was an insistence to go by this standard, then it must be made clear that all Afghan and Iraqi elections since the early 2000s are to be rendered illegitimate for the presence of US and NATO military forces at ballots.

Russia vehemently contests the claim that the referendum was rigged in favor of supporting a union with Crimea. One of the key pieces of evidence that is usually drawn upon to contest the over 90% result is the previously mentioned poll, which showed that only 41% initially voted in favour of unifying with Russia. There are three main points that contest the validity of the poll conducted by the Kiev institute of Sociology. The first is that one of the key financiers of the poll was the European Union, which is immediately argued to be a conflict of interest. The second is that the poll only takes into account a very small fraction of the population of Crimea asking “2032 respondents older than 18 years in 130 settlements in 45 districts of the country.” With only an average of 1603 responding, and with the poll covering a range of districts across the entirety of Ukraine, only a small fraction (est. 10’000 max) of Crimea out of it’s 2,033,700 populace were asked. Moreover, a look at the ethnic breakdown of Crimea reveals that 65.3% are Russian, who identify as Russian, and see themselves as part of Russia. The poll was also taken prior to major political events (such as the coup) that took place in Ukraine that ultimately caused huge shifts of opinion regarding a unification with the Russian Federation. This supposedly goes some way to explaining the magnitude of the result in the referendum, with any notion of leaked ‘true’ results or vote rigging seen as nothing more than spurious acts of slander on part of the militant Ukrainian government.

When it comes to the fate of the Tartars within Crimea, the issue is one that’s still ongoing. Shortly after the referendum, Vladimir Putin signed a decree to rehabilitate Crimean Tatars who had suffered under the Soviet dictatorship. This order seemed to be aimed at appeasing the minorities in Crimea who are concerned of the reunification with Russia. It aims to ensure that basic education can be taught in the Tartar language and encourages a ‘Cultural Renaissance’ between the multiple ethnicities of Crimea. However, whether such measures will in fact protect the Tartars from their fear of persecution still remains to be seen as Crimea integrates into the Russian Federation.

The issue of who’s in the right regarding Crimea is a contentious one. On the one hand, it was wrong of the Russian government to deny placing troops in Sevastopol and other areas of Crimea, only to have later admitted to doing so. It is also a concern that the welfare of the Tartars could be at risk if old Soviet mentality is to resurface in Crimea. However, what is Crimea’s alternative? To fall under the wing of political factions that has acquired power through violence and force? With Svoboda, a movement with open alliances to fascism, it isn’t beyond the realms of reason to believe that the Crimean people would choose to join the ranks of the former rather than the latter.


Redefining the Center (Evaluating our Terms).

The past few months have been dividing, I think, to anyone involved in politics. Some Trump supporters are growing tired of this political/cultural Stalingrad, and leftists too becoming less interested in the hysteria of their own side; and like Stalingrad there are platoons of debaters on either side, standing behind their forces willing to shoot if their side retreats. In the middle of a conflict where no middle ground seems reachable I think the problem lies in a barely definable center.

If you Google the left-right denominations it will appear similarly to this, starting from the left;

Communism, Socialism, Liberalism, Conservatism, Libertarianism, Fascism,

-and I suppose a more complex system, taking into account the two forms of Liberalism and a far-Liberalism, would be displayed as follows;

Communism, Socialism, Progressivism, Social Liberalism, Conservatism, Classical Liberalism, Libertarianism, Fascism.

For those wondering, even The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics [1] has Classical Liberalism (the belief in freedom of expression/association and the reduction of government to uphold fundamental liberties) under “right wing”, I place it here next to Libertarianism (the belief in very limited government) given the considerable amount of overlapping principles, where Classical Liberalism is almost just a moderate Libertarianism.

So, first, if anyone is unfamiliar with these terms I’m going to briefly describe each one of them, from top-down, starting left (top) to right (bottom);

Communism: seizing the means of production to share amongst the people evenly by a larger government party.
Socialism: use of government to redistribute wealth evenly amongst the people.
Progressivism: the use of government to prohibit non-left leaning values e.g. certain phrases deemed “politically incorrect”, including no-platforming speakers or writers for having a conservative political position.
Social Liberalism: the use of government to enforce left leaning values e.g. affirmative action, diversity quotas, socialized institutions like the NHS and increased welfare.
Conservatism: the use of government to enforce right leaning values e.g. abortion restriction, easing on welfare for fear of a welfare cliff (an economic argument where people stay in poverty as a result of a higher disposable income provided to them by welfare payments).
Classical Liberalism.
Fascism: use of state to enforce right leaning values to an authoritarian degree, often religiously motivated.

It is important to note, regarding Fascism, that it’s use as an extreme right wing term comes from its supposed opposition to Socialism, even though they share a lot of similarities, at least in terms of outcome. The term Fascism was invented by Benito Mussolini derived from Fasces meaning “a bundle of rods”, referring to large state which proposes that the majority should never rule, and so holds itself as anti-democracy, in a sense it is similar to advocating a de-facto Monarchy, whereas Socialism/Communism is the use of government to distribute means and control its populous and so often ends up in a similar place, where the government is irremovable by democratic vote.

So, now the basic terms have been defined I would like to add something in to the mix, that being a divide of Conservatism as there is now for Liberalism, one which also takes into account the moderate Conservatism and the extreme Conservatism. This divide will go as follows between the moderate ideologies:

…Progressivism, Social Liberalism, Social Conservatism, Religious Conservatism…

In this divide, Social Conservatism, like Social Liberalism, seeks to use government to enforce right leaning values where Religious Conservatism, like Progressivism, seeks to use government to prohibit non-right leaning values. In this, the Religious Conservative would seek to make abortion illegal for example, whereas the Social Conservative would merely want to put greater restrictions in place.

Do you notice now, however, looking at the spectrum, an inconsistency? Obviously a center currently would be one between Social Liberalism and Social Conservatism, holding positions on either side or moderately one or the other. The inconsistency occurs in the rise and fall of government power as you move from far left to far right. From Communism to Social Liberalism, there is a natural decline in government power as you become more moderate, where the extreme (Communism) is all government. However, on the right, the same cannot be said, government power increases as conservatism becomes less moderate and then all of a sudden you have “limited to no government” with Classical Liberalism and Libertarianism, and then suddenly the extreme (as one up from these two, Fascism), all government.

I would propose the following denomination between the left and right, and to make it even we’ll add two other terms to the mix: far-nationalism, meaning overt pride in one’s state and people, often to the prohibition of foreign cultures in some way, and Constitutional Conservatism, the belief in a reduction of government to constitutional rights.

(From left to right, center divided by ‘//’)

Communism, Socialism, Progressivism, Social Liberalism // Classical Liberalism, Libertarianism, Constitutional Conservatism // Social Conservatism, Religious Conservatism, Far-Nationalism, Fascism.

In this model, the center is defined as Classical Liberal (left-leaning), Libertarian (base center), and Constitutional Conservatism (right-leaning). In this model, then, the right increases naturally in government control, just like the left, as it becomes more extreme but with opposing moral stances. Far-Nationalism, just as Socialism seeks to use government to distribute wealth, seeks to use government to distribute culture. And the center, where I think a lot of people can come together on, is the reduction of government to upholding people’s fundamental freedoms and constitutional rights; freedom of expression, speech, association, religion etc. there will still be disagreements to the extent of that limitation and to what it covers, which is why a separate left/center/right system is in place for this “new center” as well, but I think under these definitions we can find a lot of common ground between the left, who are now realising that large government is only ever good if it’s your guy in charge, and the right who are seeing a backlash from their own side if they dare retreat or question this Conservative counter-revolution, particularly if you’re a non-Trump supporting right-winger (this is coming from a Trump supporter as well).

Do you agree? Disagree? let me know your thoughts on this “new center”, or if you have a different view on the terms I’ve set out. I’ll be posting an article soon on how to tell which political ideology you likely fall into if you’re unsure, so stay tuned for that!

NOTE: Alt-right, and anarcho movements like Anarcho-capitalists or Anarcho-communists are removed from this analysis because I think they represent fringe elements of other ideologies rather than mainstream political leanings, particularly anarcho beliefs since they advocate for the removal of the current system of politics altogether.

[1] McLean, Iain; McMillan, Alistair (2008). The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics (3rd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.












The Outcome Fetish: Examining the Left.

I maintain the view that leftism, as defined by social liberalism, progressivism, socialism and communism, are more concerned with outcome than opportunity, where the right doesn’t care much about outcome at all, and would cease to use it as a proof of in-opportunity. For the right, as defined by conservatism, classical liberalism, libertarianism and protectionism, inequality is a part of life so long as no inequity has taken place.

Equality, and Egalitarianism.

I used to see egalitarianism only in terms of base equality of opportunity. It is not a bad thing in my mind that there are rich and there are poor, nor is it a bad thing that some are better off than others; so long as that richness is achieved and that poorness is achieved, and so long as one did not create the other. However, I have recently been told that this belief makes me un-egalitarian. I have been told that an egalitarian speaks in terms of distributive equality, backed up by questions used to define this ideology; “Are all persons of equal moral worth? Is variation in income and wealth just?” My answer is no, and “it depends”. Certainly morality should not be tied to conversations of wealth, not because wealth is immoral, but because it has nothing to do with it; wealth is a means of survival and the acquisition of luxury, am I moral or immoral for owning a television? Am I moral or immoral for starving to death or binge-eating? There is no moral action involved.

I think the left has taken this term hostage, and uses it to justify a redistribution of outcome. And I will explain, in simple terms, why outcome is irrelevant; If I get an A in an exam, and you get a C, has inequity taken place? Is it fair to say that because I have a better upbringing, on discipline and hard work, and because I have a more stable home life, that my A is undeserved, and that too, your lack of these things makes your C undeserved? Should the solution be to give us both Bs? No, because we took the same test, with the same examiner, with the same teacher, and with the same textbook. Or what if we had the same upbringing? Would we both receive As, or is there a disparity in intelligence or enthusiasm or memory?

It is the right that asks these questions, it is the left that assumes if one person received an A, and the other a C, then injustice must have taken place.


Prioritarianism, a subset of utilitarianism, is originally defined that “benefiting people matters more the worse off these people are.” A base interpretation of which would imply that anyone in society that is seen as “worse off” should be paid special attention to, although some modern prioritarians have interpreted this as being more about the value of the benefit itself. I would argue that it is exactly the base interpretation the left has adopted (and maybe adopted falsely). It is this argument that is used to justify welfare states and socialised healthcare. Ironically of course both of these hurt the people who are  worst off, but unintentionally (from the welfare cliff to a demand-pull as people who can afford healthcare unnecessarily drain the resources).

On this, the progressive movement falls into identity politics, on “marginalised” people, a term which implies motive when is really only used to mean “minority” characteristics, and they assume that because of these characteristics, whether black, or disabled, or trans, or gay, or Muslim, or women (even though that is not a minority group), these people are worse off in society and therefore must be protected. More moderate, social liberals however fall into a similar trap of collectivism only on an economic level. They use wealth as a measurement of need, if you do not have money, by definition you “need” it, and if you do, by definition, you don’t “need” it (while all the while claiming there is more to life than money). Well that isn’t true for one reason, and it wouldn’t matter if it was for another. First, it depends entirely on what people spend their money on, a rich man may need money to start a business (which may require more than he has, although he would still be considered rich), and needs to make money from that business in order to sustain the investment, to avoid losing money – or perhaps to appeal to the humanitarians reading this, he needs money for a certain cause. Equally, a poor man may not need money if he spends it unnecessarily, also he may not be looking to make money but just to live within his means – this brings us to the reason why it wouldn’t matter either way. It will never be true on a collective level that those who need money should be given it, nor those who don’t need money should be impeded from earning more; this is because for some people earning your money is important (and living within your means), for others the opportunity to have more money can work as an incentive.

Take corporations for example, the corporation tax is designed and morally defended because, as a recent panel on BBC question time discussed, “why should the rich be getting richer?” What is not understood is that repealing or lowering tax on businesses and corporations incentivises them to invest in that country, to do more business in that country, which ultimately trickles down with job opportunities and lower prices (because the supply is easier to meet).

So back to the question of outcome, if outcome is greater across the whole, it doesn’t matter if there is a disparity in outcome individually, especially if no disparity may reduce the outcome across the whole. This is why providing opportunities to everyone, exempt from priority, can greater benefit everyone.


Privilege is one of those words used to invert the prioritarian stance by focussing on those who are “best off”. Again the distinction can be drawn between the progressive identity politics, that being white is a privilege or being male, and the social liberal view on economic privilege. First, to get the former out of the way, any notion that someone is “privileged” because of an arbitrary characteristic is as collectivist, and as bigoted, as saying that someone is a victim because of an arbitrary characteristic, remember the whole “judge people not on the colour of their skin but the content of the character”? It also operates on the assumption that western countries at least are systemically racist and sexist enough (even ran by black or female politicians) that a poor white man in a rust belt state or working in a factory 13 hours a day is more privileged than some of the most powerful people in the world.

On economic privilege, I would argue that money itself is only a privilege if you have been afforded it (by definition), which is why I find it so unusual how many people who claim that rich people are privileged enter the lottery, which, to win, would be the ultimate privilege. But obviously this is more used in relation to what can be done with the money, that money grants privilege rather than is a privilege itself. In which case… so? Everything people want grants a privilege of some sort, otherwise they wouldn’t want it, so if we’re framing things in terms of privilege, anyone who achieves something is afforded the privilege in question and every one who doesn’t, isn’t. That’s how society works, what’s your solution? Allow people the privilege without the achievement? Wouldn’t that eliminate the need for that achievement?

Going back to the earlier analogy, I want to get an A in order for the privilege of a higher chance of getting into university. If I work hard, and achieve it, and you have not, should you be offered an equally high chance as me of getting into that university? If so, why would I bother trying to achieve an A?


The finally topic I want to cover on the left’s desire to resolve “outcome” disparity, is the means by which that resolution is achieved. Consequentialism is a philosophy defined by the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy as the belief “that whether an act is morally right depends only on the consequences of that act or of something related to that act, such as the motive behind the act.” This view of the ends justifying the means is very dangerous, and something adopted by the left in almost every area of modern leftist policy. It is the politics of morality over rationality.

The more extreme proponents of this view will use it to justify violence in the name of political activism, see UC Berkeley, or warrant the punching of “Nazis” on moral grounds because the action is forgivable by the morality of the actor. Why both of these are dangerous is because anyone can have a different moral opinion, and how often are people referred to as “Nazis” or “white supremacists” unjustly because they’re right wing, or voted for Trump? If the left can make an enemy out of you on moral grounds, even if you’re on their side politically but disagree, it can justify any action to stop you under consequentialism.

Now, think of the two dividing factors I’ve outlined previously, the progressive “identity” line vs. the social liberal “economic” line. Any action, however extreme, which resolves a disparity on race or gender by the progressives will be seen as morally justifiable. And any action which resolves a disparity of income or wealth will be seen by social liberals as morally justifiable. In extreme cases, the former leads to misandry, and anti-white violence (especially if privilege is a defining factor); the latter leads to socialism. In moderate cases however, it would be the use of government policy to affect outcome, which prioritises in favour of the worst off, punishes the privileged, and framed in terms of “equality” to make any refutation of the action or policy comparable to being anti-equality, and therefore immoral (for which action may be taken against you also). This is the recipe for a totalitarian state.


People say I lack compassion because I’m not a liberal. They say I don’t care about people, that I’m robotic when it comes to how the world should run, and yet I am the only one it seems who would feel bad for a white man who grew up dreaming of success, and maybe holds some more conservative positions, having his money forcibly taken away, refused a job on the grounds of race or gender in the name of “diversity”, told that he only succeeded because of his race or gender or economic upbringing, told he’s privileged and that he should be grateful for all that is being done to him, told that he’s not doing enough to help others, forced into permanent government programs, told that he’s living in a country which benefits him the most, and then called a Nazi for wanting to limit the size of the state.

I think we can find common ground on the protection of people’s rights and freedoms, limiting the size of the state, and wanting truth in the media. But I don’t think any of us can come together until we resolve the dispute between those who want equal opportunity and personal responsibility, and the “morally superior” proprietors of outcome resolution.

Study: How Protesters Become Violent.

In October 2016, I wrote a piece about the WUO (the Weather Underground Organisation), a group of far-left domestic terrorists, and I quoted Brian Flanagan, one of the members of the group, saying that “when you feel that you have right on your side, you can do some horrific things.” I talked about a connection the modern left felt to the protest movement of the 60s, but without as much cause, and I asked if it was possible that a new group like the WUO could form, and I believe that Antifa (or Anti-fascists) is that group.

Even though I would like to focus this article on the left-wing, the antifa of UC Berkeley, who recently beat and pepper-sprayed audience members there to see a speech by right-wing editor Milo Yiannopoulos; one of whom, according to a student, was beaten so hard he suffered broken ribs even through a Kevlar vest; even though I would like to discuss how the left has turned its back on free speech, or at least the fringe “anti-fascists” who can’t see the irony of silencing alternative points of view, this is more than just a partisan issue. There are members of both sides who commit violence for political aim, and in any protest there are risks of rioting (although this in no way excuses what happened in Berkeley), so what is it that leads people into acts of political violence, and is it ever acceptable?

The Origin of Violence:

1. The Intensity of Moral Standing.

James M. Jasper in the Annual Review of Sociology, 2011, wrote about the connection between “Emotions and Social Movements”. He writes about what he calls ‘affective loyalties’, an admiration or ‘cognitive appraisal’ of another person or object. It is said that people in the modern day are more impressed by virtues of celebrity than they are by intellectual virtues, and if that be the case I would argue that maybe what we’re seeing is a quasi-religious alignment to what was once called a “role model”. First of all think about that phrasing in itself, “this is the model for what your role should be,” and so people attach themselves to these people not as admiration so much, but as adoration, and the desire to be like this person. The power of celebrity opinions over people’s political beliefs may not have as much effect as celebrities want them to but they do have an effect. In this sense it could be argued that a sort of cult-ish desire to be seen on the same side as a celebrity you adore can lead to a heightened emotional connection with a certain argument, although I would argue that it would take more than this for it to become violent (despite celebrities like David Harbour from Stranger Things promoting violence at SAG, or Madonna talking about blowing up the White House).

Jasper continues his analysis by talking about the power of moral emotions, which “involve feelings of approval or disapproval based on moral institutions and principles, as well as satisfactions we feel when we do the right (or wrong) thing” (p2). So maybe on a base psychological level, as we may desire approval from a parental figure, and formerly from a religious institution, we have assigned the role of moral guardian to those we adore on a celebrity level, intensifying an already emotional connection by affective loyalty.

Although you would not necessarily have to tie this concept to celebrity, any form of competing collective solidarities like the left versus the right involves a moral guardian. Without religion, or a rational proof of secular ethics, or a government for whom morality can be dictated by (thankfully), we may instinctively attach an invisible moral guide to any scenario, by need of one. In other words, everyone may attach a moral figure, who may not exist, to their arguments (which is why logic never seems to intervene in what is “right or wrong”) the survival of whom holds priority over the discovery of fact. In that sense, every time we have an argument we are defending the existence of our moral guides where to be proven wrong has a far more detrimental effect on a person’s psychology than just to change their minds. It becomes a war of morals.

Or maybe an argument has a sort of “good son” effect, where two sides argue over, in space of any identifiable set of demands, “what father wants”.

2. Under Threat: Shame, Pride, and Anxiety.

Outlined by Jaspers collection of research, Scheff (1994) indicates that “pride generates and signals a secure bond, just as shame generates and signals a threatened bond.” This, I guess, would be where arguments form on the basis of guilt. The “if you don’t agree with me, you are a bad person” position, often held by the left, who have been placed on such a proud hierarchy they struggle now to contemplate the idea that any loss to them is a loss at all, and not an evil takeover by the other side. In other words, to lose generates such a fall from grace, such a shame, that the threat can lead to a strong moral shock. Could this be an instigator to violence? We know that according to a field study by Miller and Krosnick (of Minnesota and Ohio State) in 2004, threat is a higher cause of political activism than opportunity. They offered different versions of a letter by a political lobbying organisation to potential contributers, one threatening an undesired policy, another showing opportunity for a desired policy and a lot more contributed under the threat letter than the opportunity. We know therefore the power of threat on political action, but is it enough of a shock to form violence out of protest?

Consider when it is combined with anxiety. According to Jasper, anxiety is generated “when norms are violated; the more they are violated, and the more strategically central those norms to people, then the greater the anxiety” (p7). So maybe political violence can be the result of the shame of losing moral superiority, and the threat of immoral takeover, combined with an anxiety or an aversion to change. The WUO may not have fit in that category, given it was the change, but in today’s politics the pendulum has swung over to the other side. Liberalism is the norm, and conservatism/libertarianism is the change, and we know how violently some of the establishment conservatives reacted against leftists in the 1960s. In that sense, maybe parties have nothing to do with it, maybe it is all about power. But of course, given the WUO this can only be one of several motivators.

3. The Strategic Trap of Stigma.

Another point raised by Jasper in 2010, outlying a position by Gamson 1995, is that “movements by stigmatised groups face a strategic dilemma: they are trying to remove the group stereotypes or even the very categories, that shame them, yet they use these same identities to mobilize supporters.” You can apply this problem to real world examples on both the left and the right. Some student conservatives feel their ability to express their political views are being stunted by pro-liberal campuses or lecturers and will see themselves as stigmatised. They want to remove this stigma, but can only do so by convincing others that it exists. On the left too, feminists, or black lives matter who consider themselves stigmatised must prove this fact to others in order to gather support. It may be a stretch, but it is possible that, maybe even unconsciously, some of these groups know that violence begets violence and that if they have to instigate it so that they can blame and use examples of violence from the opposition to gain supporters, they will do. This would be the trap of needing stigma more than wanting to remove it, so much so they will fight to create it against themselves.

We know that many in the media after UC Berkeley for example suggested that the violence by Antifa on the left was actually right-wing agitators. If this is true, it proves the above point, if it is not true, it proves the above point.

Acceptability and Aftermath:

1. Violence by Scale.

Personally, I don’t believe it is ever acceptable to instigate violence in any scenario, political or otherwise (violence for self defence etc. I do not consider an instigation). However, it becomes a tricky subject when discussing violence that is met with greater violence. Neither is morally acceptable, but which is more excusable, the greater violence in response? or the initial violence which may have been small? Equally I think motive plays an important factor in this too. During the Guatemalan protests between 1954 and the early 1980s, specifically in Chupol, the insurgency was met with greater military violence to combat it. According to O’Kane, of the Political Studies Review, “the purpose of the brutal defeat… was to preserver the old order of power and privileges.” So, as a moral exercise, which was more acceptable? Were the military correct to meet violence with violence in self defense, even if it was in favour of an arguably totalitarian regime? Were the people right to enact violence in the first place if there was no direct violence attributed to them first? Is the greater violence by the military worse than the initial violence by the insurgents? To be clear, in this real case I think it could be argued easily that the insurgents were acting on self defense but at face value, if the only problem was  “power and privilege” is the violence acceptable? If it is, then violence on the left has been legitimised since the left wing, from feminists to black lives matter, have been framing western societies as imbalanced on power and privilege for a long time now (more frequently in the last few years).

The question over whether that claim was true then or is true now is irrelevant, if people believe it to be true, that we are living in an unequal society (by opportunity), then to accept that as a moral motive to political violence is to give people reason to commit it on the left right now, and whenever it is believed and believed falsely. It sets a precedent, where violence can be recruited by persuading people into victim-hood, an easy thing to do.

2. An Obsession with Conspiracy.

Timothy Tackett, a historian writing about the French revolution, writes:

“ON THE MORNING OF MAY 23, 1792, in the third year of the French Revolution, Jacques-Pierre Brissot and Armand Gensonne climbed to the rostrum to address the National Assembly. In successive speeches, the two deputies revealed the existence of a terrifying plot to destroy the Assembly and the revolution itself. The whole was masterminded by the “Machiavellian” Austrian minister, Prince Wenzel Von Kaunitz, but it was coordinated in France by a shadowy “Austrian Committee” of the king’s closest advisers, and it was said to be responsible for almost all the ills besetting the new French regime: the disappointing results of the recently declared war, the counterrevolutionary movements in the countryside, and even the divisions within the Assembly itself.”

This, outlining the attempt by the Assembly to whip up conspiracy in the time of a revolution is incredibly prevalent today. With the conspiracy of “Russian Hacking” and Putin-led propaganda, to the aforementioned “right-wing agitators”, it seems like a tactic of political movements who currently hold power, perhaps out of fear of losing it or the previously described anxiety, fall upon conspiracy to explain their loss, often tied to the notion of an “evil uprising”, again substantiating my earlier point. So the question is, why? It could be an attempt to salvage what dignity they have and to avoid the throes of shame, pushing their own supporters to the opposition, equally it could be a way to manipulate their supporters into radicalization. Or perhaps just a way to delegitimise their enemies. Either way, even in defeat, “Ideologies must portray the movement as having history on its side – but only in the end, someday” (Voss, 1996).

Tackett quotes Lynn Hunt, “the obsession with conspiracy became the central organizing principle of French revolutionary rhetoric. The narrative of Revolution was dominated by plots.” And I think the notion of ‘plot’ in political thinking is underestimated. In every story there are the good and bad, the moral and immoral, and so much dominated by fiction today, I think it makes sense a deep rooted aversion to be seen as the villain, and not the hero, to any degree that even in defeat it is a tragedy where the hero has lost. So I suppose what you have are different people fighting as their own protagonists, unable to see that these are just different perspectives. Can even literature be blamed for that? Fantasy, superhero movies over more complex and non-moral or mythical storytelling? If so, perhaps it is not about power, or ideology, but about culture.

If you have any other thoughts or ideas about the underlying roots of political violence, or disagree with something I’ve argued leave a comment down below, I’d love to hear your thoughts on the subject.





Are We Living in an Orwellian Dystopia?

The New York Times recently published an article entitled, “Why ‘1984’ is a 2017 Must Read,” a statement I can whole heartedly agree with, only for different reasons. Now, stepping aside the irony of the New York Times calling anything Orwellian, given they were caught in a WikiLeaks release exchanging emails with John Podesta, they are correct that George Orwell’s novel did predict the current state of the world, only it is, as I would argue, the state of the left not the current Trump administration nor any right-wing upsurge he predicted. I would go one step further and say that the right-wing upsurge is a revolution against what has become the IngSoc (English Socialism).

I can argue this on four points.

1. Doublethink & “Alternative Facts”.

The controversy over Kellyanne Conway’s statement, Sean Spicer, our press secretary, gave alternative facts”, led to a reported boom in sales of the George Orwell classic. The argument is that the notion of “alternative facts” was similar to Orwell’s doublethink – the idea that you could have two conflicting truths exist simultaneously. In the novel, people learn doublethink in order to fit in and is tied to the Big Brother propaganda. In other words, “alternative facts” are given by a government to manipulate people into thinking that both their statements and the facts they’ve been given elsewhere are mutually correct, even though they are contradictory; this leads neither of them to be able to be considered correct over the other. The purpose of doing so, as I interpret it, would be to make it unclear in a person’s mind who is telling the truth, therefore allowing the government to lie and not be held accountable for it.

While I agree that Conway’s wording was stupid, she did not outright say “we present alternative facts” full stop. Rather, I think, in the context of the conversation she was probably implying that the media’s “facts” were not facts at all. Maybe they had alternative information that backed up their own statements. Or maybe she did mean that in which case I won’t defend her for it, but it doesn’t seem likely, actually if you read the transcript it does just sound like a bad phrasing that reporters leaped on. But why? Why would a journalist seek to find any opportunity, however far fetched, to delegitimise the president? Well it’s a simple answer, because they see him as an opponent to their ideology. I mean think about it, imagine how stupid a masterfully manipulative totalitarian administration would have to be to accidentally tell people they’re lying to them, and yet the media is treating this like a full blown scandal.

By its very nature, two contradicting arguments accepted as fact does imply that one of them is false but it does not say which one. It could be either, so who do you believe? The media, or the government? This is an easy question to answer. First, you do not believe the media, who has spent the last year corroborating the Democratic party doctrine and favouring the Obama administration by cult of personality, but you do not believe any government who can use that precedent of trust to tell you anything they want to in future. So who do you believe? Well, that’s just it. To even ask the question is a problem in itself, if you have to rely on a statement of fact to believe that a fact is correct, without evidence, based solely on the reliability of its source, you are setting that same precedent.

2. Big Brother & Thought Crime.

The Big Brother character in Orwell’s book represents a totalitarian state, one that surveils its people, and punishes them for what is considered a thought crime. There are thought police who seek to make sure that everyone believes universally that which is dictated by a big brother government. If I were to put anything in the modern day to this category, barring the advocacy of big governments like the European Union, it would be political correctness.

By its very origin, political correctness (the “I don’t know if I can say that” ideology), was used to silence alternative opinions. According to Kohl, “The term “politically correct” was used disparagingly, to refer to someone whose loyalty overrode compassion, and led to bad politics.”

Now, whether or not you accept Kohl’s analysis, just look at the term itself. A ‘politic’ is an opinion on how the world should be run. To say that someone’s opinion on how the world should be run is not ‘correct’ is to say that they are guilty of wrong think; a thought crime. However, rarely is it used in the modern day to refer to someone’s politics – it may not be politically incorrect to vote for Donald Trump, but both Donald Trump and his supporters are likely politically incorrect, which is a subtle difference. Equally, it is not often used to direct or punish thought (unless you belong to the “objectification” school of Feminism), but to direct or punish the expression of thought, in language. Language policing is not thought policing, that is unless you apply motive. Then you can demonise based on the assumption of thought by association to, or expression of, thought which is seen to be “incorrect”.

Closer still, is the concept of “hate crime”. To punish differently a man who attacks someone else, from a man who attacks someone else based on a protected characteristic, is to make motive the only arbiter. If to commit a crime based on prejudice is worse than that same crime with any other motive, you are punishing the thought of hate, so you are ruling on a thought crime. It also sets a precedent, where motive can be assumed and applied by the ideology of political correctness, for which, given its ever-changing set of rules, anyone at any moment can be culpable. A regular crime today, can be a hate crime tomorrow even if, to you, your motive is the same.

Either way political correctness toes a fine line to Orwell’s thought police.

3. The Ministry of Truth & Plenty.

I published an article last week discussing what I called the Papacy of Experts, tying the concept of “expert opinions” to propaganda and religiosity. From that article I assert that “bishops of the holy see pass down some truth which is known to be had by the holiness of the man who told it to them, as so can an expert pass down his truth, which is known to be had by the intelligence of the man who told it to him.” My point being that facts from institutions whether it’s centered around climate change, psychology, economics or other sciences should not be trusted religiously by the titles of the men who claim them. Anyone labeled a “science denier” for being sceptical about any of these purported facts are being silenced from doing the job of a scientist, which is scepticism, by a threat of social exclusion. This in no small way can be attributed to Orwell’s Ministry of Truth, responsible for revising the truth, in line with the state’s interpretation of events.

In the same vein, the “fake news” witch trials in the mainstream media which primarily targeted conservative websites who disagreed with their liberal narrative, is a perfect example of an attempt to control “truth” as it is perceived and to do so on credibility and overt representation. In other words, in every paper, on every screen, on every website, bleeding its way even to the entertainment industry. We are so much dominated by celebrity and fiction that when Kellyanne Conway used the phrase “alternative facts”, millions of people rushed to purchase a fictional novel, it is also why we watch Schindler’s List in History class to teach us about the holocaust, because education shares too a philosophy and a message. It does not seek to inform, it seeks to instruct. By definition, it seeks to “educate” (give intellectual, moral, and social instruction to…).

4. IngSoc (English Socialism).

Make no mistake, Orwell’s nineteen eighty-four was not a criticism of right wing nationalism, nor really fascism (if fascism is to be believed on the far right), but rather soviet-socialism. It was anti-collectivism; or Oligarchical Collectivism, as described in the book, which “rejects and vilifies every principle for which the Socialist movement originally stood, and it does so in the name of socialism.”

Another passage in the book explains the ideology as follows, “The German Nazis and the Russian Communists came very close […] in their methods, but they never had the courage to recognize their own motives. They pretended, perhaps they even believed, that they had seized power unwillingly and for a limited time, and that just round the corner there lay a paradise where human beings would be free and equal. We are not like that.”

Now, from the left at the moment we have the democratic socialists, of Bernie Sanders, who probably do believe that human beings would be free and equal as a result of government power. We have global socialism, of Hillary Clinton and the European Union, probably belonging to the ideology of the Ingsoc, and we have the antifas, or anti fascists, a sub section of protesters, often seen in the modern day sporting socialist flags, seeking to “defeat capitalism” for the sake of humanity; not to mention the Newspeak style shortening of the name. It seems then a bit ironic to label the Trump administration, by most extreme accounts protectionist, patriotic and nationalist, to the Big Brother of nineteen eighty-four, when the labelers represent everything within that ideology.

Ingsoc is formed of moral relativism and collectivism, so too, is the modern left – from identity politics to nihilism and existentialism, the modern left is the perfect representation of Ingsoc.


Even such a brief analysis as this, it seems absurd to apply the Orwellian label anywhere else than in an ideology where anyone opposed to the prevailing narrative is “post-truth” (a far more dangerous and subtle form of manipulation than “alternative truth”); where people march in the streets for a global European superstate; where non-liberal voters are called “low information”; where in Nottingham it is a hate crime to be “mysogynistic”; where in Scotland there is an Offensive Behaviours Act; where in Canada, they tried to ban gossiping in public places; where in America Barack Obama used the IRS to target conservatives, preventing them from running against him; where the government can decide how much you should earn, and where the rest of that earning should go; where a candidate can be considered for office who deleted documents so that they cannot be investigated (an Orwellian memory hole); and worse, where people can be so brainwashed as to read a copy of nineteen eighty-four, and believe it to be a book opposed to patriotism, nationalism, and constitutional conservatism.

Although, the only thing a boom in copies sold of nineteen-eighty four proves, is that none of these people have read it yet, so I suppose that makes sense.

The Papacy of Experts.

It is often laughed at, the denial of expert opinions; that when an expert says “jump”, only a fool would question his degree in suicidology – and his knowledge on the subject. You will have heard from pundit postulaters, and educated comedians, that we are living in a post-truth world, why? Because we do not trust the experts anymore.

So what is an expert opinion? Is it one that can only be had with knowledge of the facts, and to deny that opinion is to deny those facts? (Whether they’re provided to you or not?) Is it one that only experts can have, and if you’re not an expert your opinion is not quite as important? Is it one where the qualifier, “expert”, turns opinions into facts. Well it seems to me, the difference between my opinion and an “expert” is the same between an estimate and a guess, one may be more educated, but neither of them are predictions.

The truth is, that an expert is simply just a man who cannot bear to be proven wrong. If he was not, then he would not need to call upon his qualifications to make an argument, he would simply present the facts. In this sense, to preface the word “opinion” with “expert” is like prefacing any word with a pronoun, all it tells us is that it is the opinion of an expert, not that the opinion itself is expert, and it does this because the validity of an opinion does not increase by the skills required for it to be ascertained.

Let’s pretend that I am an expert in literature. I will tell you, in my expert opinion, that the novel Of Mice and Men is objectively better written than Lord of the Flies. And I mean objectively because of its structure, the use of language, and the skilful integration of plot and theme. Would you accept my statement because I know more on the subject than you do? Even if you prefer Lord of the Flies?

“Well no, that’s different, that’s subjective. There is no gradation in prose, there are no numbers in literature.” Well, which expert told you that? And why do you believe him? I have plenty of knowledge in narratology and once more a range of figures and polling data about which styles appeal to more people. I’m not going to show you of course, but you are expected to trust that I have them, after all, I’m an expert on the subject.

So when I hear that 97% of scientists can agree, or 9 in 10, all I can think is that if 97% of scientists can agree, when the job of a scientist is to be sceptical until finding proof, then by willing to agree 97% of scientists are not doing their job. Rather, they are being compliant, because if it were proven, it would not have to be agreed. And it is also probably true, that so many of those 97% could merely be banking on each other’s expertise to guide their opinions. On top of that I would trust more the opinion of a friend who’s done his research, than a man who is paid to provide his opinions, as I would trust a friend who has read a book more than I would trust a quote, hand-picked and purchased, from a best-selling author who praises it.

From expert to expert, opinions can be passed down, like teacher to student, through some apostolic succession; bishops of the holy see pass down some truth which is known to be had by the holiness of the man who told it to them, as so can an expert pass down his truth, which is known to be had by the intelligence of the man who told it to him. And if a papacy of God can be dictated by the Counts of Tusculum, and the Theophylacti, a dark-age aristocracy, then is it such a conspiracy to think that a papacy of experts can be corrupted also?

Science has become a religion in two ways; while different in its approach, in evidence over faith, its followers do so by faith and faith alone. The second way, is that both a man with a PhD in Theoretical Physics, and a man who claims to be a successor to Saint Peter, with a direct line to the word of God, can speak ex cathedra (“from the chair”) to define what people should or should not believe. A scientist would say of God that if one cannot provide any evidence, there can be no claim to His existence, and yet all too willing is he to expect to be believed without providing evidence of his own claims. And so too are fans of science willing to proclaim that a belief in God is a form of brainwashing, Church propaganda, and yet not at all willing to look further into the propaganda of “expert opinions”.

So where does it come from? I know we are living in a society which shames people for being wrong more than it teaches them what is right, so maybe people are so afraid of being beaten in a debate, they will preach the reliability of their sources more than help to explain what the sources mean, and how they can be interpreted. That is a real post-truth world, and so I would urge you to remember that truth is refuted by reasonable doubt, and opinions are only upheld by a preponderance of evidence. Experts should be treated atheistically, their opinions no more consecrated than the opinions of an old man in papal regalia.

The Coudenhove-Kalergi Plan: The Man Behind Europe.

Aristocratic in his origins, Count Richard Von Coudenhove-Kalergi was an Austrian Japanese politician and philosopher. He was the pioneer of European integration, and the founder of the Pan-European Union movement during the mid 1920s (which would later act as the ideological underpin for the modern day European Union).

Kalergi claimed that societies broke up into two distinct cultures across the world, the country and the city. He argued that country life is organic, irrational, religious and superstitious. He referred to “Country Aristocrats” as Junkers. Kalergi described these people as having “Maximum character and minimum intellect.” Junkers are more likely to be religious, superstitious, and have a dislike of socialism.

City culture on the other hand is more mechanical and rational. Those from city culture are more likely to be secular, have an alliance with socialism, and create a society of writers and intellectuals. The people of a city background are progressive, witty, and materialistic. They rush ahead of their times, creating modern ideas in politics.

He argued that because the city and rural folk have conflicting beliefs, ideas, and mindsets, they inevitably share an outright hostility to each other. The city folk in particular will have a strong dislike of what they deemed to be the backward Junker. However, Kalergi believed that whilst the city intellectual and the country Junker disagreed on life, philosophy, and politics they’re not only compatible with each other, but related. Both stem from one unifying heritage, and it is possible their ideas and principles can co-exist in harmony through compromise.

Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Pan-European vision was one in which the world would comprise of five states, and would be known as the United States of Europe. The five states would consist of continental countries taking possession of Africa, a pan-America in which the North and South Americas would become one, the then USSR would expand to Eurasia, and a pan-Asian union where Japan and China control in the Pacific. English would be the spoken language of the world, and exist alongside the native tongue of any given country. In the United States of Europe, individualism would exist in harmony alongside socialism, and capitalism would co-exist with communism.

Whilst the geography of his European vision is straightforward, how is a society supposed to function properly in Coudenhove-Kalergi’s world when the two conflicting systems of capitalism and communism operate in the same space? Karl Marx’s communist approach requires that the collective own the means of production by way of the state, yet the laissez-faire capitalist model strives to champion free market enterprise and commerce. Such a severe contradiction would surely impede the success of any society, as the clash between state and private interests are forever causing stagnation in a country’s ability to flourish. Theoretically, what would exist is an economic power structure in which private companies collude alongside the government to create profit (in other words, corporatism).

Alongside economic issues, there would be a strong conflict of dominating religions from the middle east to the west, where the only viable option would seem to be a complete dissolve of religion in favour of a secular union. An atheist’s dream maybe, but short term opposition would be violent and difficult to resolve without violence.

One of the first questions to ask is who will actually agree to it? Presumably a person or body (be it Kalergi or a small group of intellectuals) see themselves as having the power to dictate to the world that theirs is not only the best culture, but so superior as to force onto other nations. Which country will acquiesce and hand their sovereignty, culture, and the very fabric of their social identity over to a European elite? I would wager none of them. Would the anti-world order powers of Russia just suddenly bow to their demands and pull down the Kremlin? Would China and Japan simply cease fighting over island territories in the East China Sea chain?

In order to take the varied number of cultures and societies and combine them would require universal compliance from all of the people inhabiting these countries. If history has taught us one thing, achieving universal thought requires universal control. Europe would therefore have to force the world’s hand. What could ignite are devastating conflicts conducted on an industrial scale. Entire cultures that refused to bend to the whim of European integration would be labelled nothing more than xenophobic and hateful, and one that must be thwarted by the paragons in Europe. We can already see early rumblings of such attitudes in today’s society, with arguments that Brexit in the UK was paramount to fascism, and the US vote for anti-establishment Trump was a backwards racist, and sexist move. Whenever the people vote against a political power, the response must be to decry them and present them as a deplorable force against the greater good.

Today’s European Union champions Coudenhove-Kalergi and his philosophy. He is almost entirely unknown to the masses, but within the spheres of EU power he is much idolised, with his ideas being hailed as the leading light on how the future world should be shaped. There is even a foundation named after the man, the Coudenhove-Kalergi Foundation, which awards the European Prize to those who have shown considerable support, and make significant contributions to the pursuit of an integrated Europe.

We can already see EU policy being made that lunges with inexhaustible enthusiasm towards an integrated European Union. It could even be argued that in recent times this Union grows with scandalous desperation. A look at the membership of Croatia (P.3), as told by a member of the European Scrutiny Comittee, shows how the Croatian government failed to meet its targets for an independent judiciary, and failed to get corruption out of the police force. Despite the unsuccessful criteria, the EU decided to let Croatia in regardless because they broadly believed in enlargement of the European state. Whilst absolute integration looks ever more unlikely given today’s diplomatic and geo-political situation, the recent changes seen across Western Europe have a startling resemblance to the early stages of Richard Von Coudenhove-Kalergi’s plan, and this makes for a very sobering thought.

Kalergi had a vision for a system of governance too, in which a conservative society made up of “great Europeans” would supersede any democratic rule of the five states, creating legislation that this group deems best for the people of Europe. This society would be appointed to their position due in part to their academic eminence, and loyalty to the European ideal.

In 2017, we can already see some considerable elements of the Count’s vision in practice. The European Commission for instance, is a society of 28 unelected officials that hold the absolute power to create regulation/directives, as seen in the FC0 30/1048, “European Integration: legal Constitutional Implications” (1971). This reflects Coudenhove-Kalergi’s government model of a small elite society ruling over a league of nations.

Kalergi also strove to remove racial diversity, and instead pursue the goal of an ethnically homogeneous and inclusive European nation based on a single set of values. In his book Praktischer Idealismus (Practical Idealism) his belief in eugenics is outlined, “The man of the future will be a mongrel. Today’s races will disappear- the Eurasian Negro race of the future, similar in its outward appearance to the ancient Egyptians will replace the diversity of its peoples with a diversity of individuals.” (P.7) It’s apparent that Coudenhove-Kalergi’s desire to pull the world into one giant European conglomerate does not just end at the point of governance, but at the point of biology and society as a whole. The suggestion of removing all forms of racial and national identity would require a vast number of indigenous cultures to be broken down and discarded by Pan-European dogma.

The biggest indicator of this in practice today is with the issue of mass immigration. In Germany, migration has reached staggering numbers running into the millions, with increases of 46% between 2014 and 2015 (an estimated 672,000 people). When such an overwhelming population comes into Germany (most of which have no understanding of the language) the services to educate and cater to their needs can’t cope. This inevitably means that migrants set up their own communities amongst themselves. These communities bare no relation to the indigenous culture of Germany, and neither shares the values nor principles that exist within the country. As this community grows, studies have shown that the indigenous German population is in decline. Birth rates in Germany have in fact slumped to such a low that it’s not just one of the smallest in Europe, but now competes globally. If this trend is to continue, the idea of the German people being a minority in Germany will not be a question of “if,” but “when”. The demographic shift will invariably lead to a cultural shift, and a breakdown of the German way of life. The consequences of such a breakdown can be seen in other parts of the world where this trend has reached the point of no return, such as the Lebanon in which the cultural change led to civil war and the rise in power of numerous terrorist groups, the most notable being Hezbollah.

Coudenhove-Kalergi’s European dream seems palatable to many people, a league of nations that would unite as one. A world in which there is no race that can be oppressed, with universal rights, and a world in which personality is the diversity, not race. These pursuits of racial integration however, fail to factor in one key aspect of human nature, tribalism. Be it through music, art, style, or nationality, human feats and cultural history have given way to various groups that individuals can subscribe to. It could be ‘mods’ or ‘greasers’ or youthful ‘hip’ clothing over more conservative classic numbers, the need for group identity will always shine through. Alongside this will invoke prejudice, both from the people within these groups (about how they dress or the political views that they have) or from others attacking that group. In short, people will always find something to discriminate against even if race is taken out of the picture.

What recent events have gone to show, is that people will always choose to preserve their own cultural and national identities over a mass unintelligible network, with its activities known only to those who work within it. History has taught that the larger governments govern badly, and with often iniquitous results. Yet time and again we still see the championing of such systems, which hand sovereignty to far off powers that face little responsibility and even less in the way of detention for wrongdoing. This sets a dangerous precedent that culminates not only in the loss of national identity, but a loss in prosperity, culture, and above all freedom.